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Old 07-04-2011, 09:53 AM
 
Default ipv6: netfilter: ip6_tables: fix infoleak to userspace CVE-2011-1172

From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/801483

Structures ip6t_replace, compat_ip6t_replace, and xt_get_revision are
copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are
zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument
to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive
information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe
process.

The first bug was introduced before the git epoch; the second was
introduced in 3bc3fe5e (v2.6.25-rc1); the third is introduced by
6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1). To trigger the bug one should have
CAP_NET_ADMIN.

CVE-2011-1172

Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <paolo.pisati@canonical.com>
---
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 3 +++
1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
index acaba15..68fb45e 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
@@ -1047,6 +1047,7 @@ do_replace(void __user *user, unsigned int len)
return -ENOMEM;
if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
return -ENOMEM;
+ tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;

newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
if (!newinfo)
@@ -1162,6 +1163,7 @@ do_add_counters(void __user *user, unsigned int len)

if (copy_from_user(&tmp, user, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
+ tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;

if (len != sizeof(tmp) + tmp.num_counters*sizeof(struct xt_counters))
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1313,6 +1315,7 @@ do_ip6t_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len)
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
+ rev.name[sizeof(rev.name)-1] = 0;

if (cmd == IP6T_SO_GET_REVISION_TARGET)
target = 1;
--
1.7.4.1


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Old 07-04-2011, 02:08 PM
 
Default ipv6: netfilter: ip6_tables: fix infoleak to userspace CVE-2011-1172

From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/801483

commit upstream 6a8ab060779779de8aea92ce3337ca348f973f54

Structures ip6t_replace, compat_ip6t_replace, and xt_get_revision are
copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are
zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument
to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive
information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe
process.

The first bug was introduced before the git epoch; the second was
introduced in 3bc3fe5e (v2.6.25-rc1); the third is introduced by
6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1). To trigger the bug one should have
CAP_NET_ADMIN.

CVE-2011-1172

Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <paolo.pisati@canonical.com>
---
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 3 +++
1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
index acaba15..68fb45e 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
@@ -1047,6 +1047,7 @@ do_replace(void __user *user, unsigned int len)
return -ENOMEM;
if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
return -ENOMEM;
+ tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;

newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
if (!newinfo)
@@ -1162,6 +1163,7 @@ do_add_counters(void __user *user, unsigned int len)

if (copy_from_user(&tmp, user, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
+ tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;

if (len != sizeof(tmp) + tmp.num_counters*sizeof(struct xt_counters))
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1313,6 +1315,7 @@ do_ip6t_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len)
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
+ rev.name[sizeof(rev.name)-1] = 0;

if (cmd == IP6T_SO_GET_REVISION_TARGET)
target = 1;
--
1.7.4.1


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Old 07-04-2011, 02:50 PM
Stefan Bader
 
Default ipv6: netfilter: ip6_tables: fix infoleak to userspace CVE-2011-1172

On 04.07.2011 16:08, paolo.pisati@canonical.com wrote:
> From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
>
> BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/801483
>
> commit upstream 6a8ab060779779de8aea92ce3337ca348f973f54
>
> Structures ip6t_replace, compat_ip6t_replace, and xt_get_revision are
> copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are
> zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument
> to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive
> information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe
> process.
>
> The first bug was introduced before the git epoch; the second was
> introduced in 3bc3fe5e (v2.6.25-rc1); the third is introduced by
> 6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1). To trigger the bug one should have
> CAP_NET_ADMIN.
>
> CVE-2011-1172
>
> Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
> Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <paolo.pisati@canonical.com>
> ---
> net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 3 +++
> 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
> index acaba15..68fb45e 100644
> --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
> +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
> @@ -1047,6 +1047,7 @@ do_replace(void __user *user, unsigned int len)
> return -ENOMEM;
> if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
> return -ENOMEM;
> + tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
>
> newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
> if (!newinfo)

Same as for previous patch. Just to be sure below hunk is right.

> @@ -1162,6 +1163,7 @@ do_add_counters(void __user *user, unsigned int len)
>
> if (copy_from_user(&tmp, user, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
> return -EFAULT;
> + tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
>
> if (len != sizeof(tmp) + tmp.num_counters*sizeof(struct xt_counters))
> return -EINVAL;

> @@ -1313,6 +1315,7 @@ do_ip6t_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len)
> ret = -EFAULT;
> break;
> }
> + rev.name[sizeof(rev.name)-1] = 0;
>
> if (cmd == IP6T_SO_GET_REVISION_TARGET)
> target = 1;


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Old 07-04-2011, 04:27 PM
 
Default ipv6: netfilter: ip6_tables: fix infoleak to userspace CVE-2011-1172

From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/801483

commit upstream 6a8ab060779779de8aea92ce3337ca348f973f54

Structures ip6t_replace, compat_ip6t_replace, and xt_get_revision are
copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are
zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument
to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive
information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe
process.

The first bug was introduced before the git epoch; the second was
introduced in 3bc3fe5e (v2.6.25-rc1); the third is introduced by
6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1). To trigger the bug one should have
CAP_NET_ADMIN.

CVE-2011-1172

Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <paolo.pisati@canonical.com>
---
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 2 ++
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
index acaba15..e02284a 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
@@ -1047,6 +1047,7 @@ do_replace(void __user *user, unsigned int len)
return -ENOMEM;
if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
return -ENOMEM;
+ tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;

newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
if (!newinfo)
@@ -1313,6 +1314,7 @@ do_ip6t_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len)
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
+ rev.name[sizeof(rev.name)-1] = 0;

if (cmd == IP6T_SO_GET_REVISION_TARGET)
target = 1;
--
1.7.4.1


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