From: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>

CVE-2011-1494

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/787145

Released until now with stable versions 2.6.32.40, 2.6.33.13, 2.6.38.6

At two points in handling device ioctls via /dev/mpt2ctl, user-supplied
length values are used to copy data from userspace into heap buffers
without bounds checking, allowing controllable heap corruption and
subsequently privilege escalation.

Additionally, user-supplied values are used to determine the size of a
copy_to_user() as well as the offset into the buffer to be read, with no
bounds checking, allowing users to read arbitrary kernel memory.

Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Acked-by: Eric Moore <eric.moore@lsi.com>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@suse.de>
(backported from commit a1f74ae82d133ebb2aabb19d181944b4e83e9960 upstream)
Signed-off-by: Herton Krzesinski <herton.krzesinski@canonical.com>
---
drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_ctl.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
1 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_ctl.c b/drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_ctl.c
index d88e975..9e689c8 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_ctl.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_ctl.c
@@ -637,6 +637,13 @@ _ctl_do_mpt_command(struct MPT2SAS_ADAPTER *ioc,
data_out_sz = karg.data_out_size;
data_in_sz = karg.data_in_size;

+ /* Check for overflow and wraparound */
+ if (karg.data_sge_offset * 4 > ioc->request_sz ||
+ karg.data_sge_offset > (UINT_MAX / 4)) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
/* copy in request message frame from user */
if (copy_from_user(mpi_request, mf, karg.data_sge_offset*4)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "failure at %s:%d/%s()!
", __FILE__, __LINE__,
@@ -1883,7 +1890,7 @@ _ctl_diag_read_buffer(void __user *arg, enum block_state state)
Mpi2DiagBufferPostReply_t *mpi_reply;
int rc, i;
u8 buffer_type;
- unsigned long timeleft;
+ unsigned long timeleft, request_size, copy_size;
u16 smid;
u16 ioc_status;
u8 issue_reset = 0;
@@ -1919,6 +1926,8 @@ _ctl_diag_read_buffer(void __user *arg, enum block_state state)
return -ENOMEM;
}

+ request_size = ioc->diag_buffer_sz[buffer_type];
+
if ((karg.starting_offset % 4) || (karg.bytes_to_read % 4)) {
printk(MPT2SAS_ERR_FMT "%s: either the starting_offset "
"or bytes_to_read are not 4 byte aligned
", ioc->name,
@@ -1926,13 +1935,23 @@ _ctl_diag_read_buffer(void __user *arg, enum block_state state)
return -EINVAL;
}

+ if (karg.starting_offset > request_size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
diag_data = (void *)(request_data + karg.starting_offset);
dctlprintk(ioc, printk(MPT2SAS_DEBUG_FMT "%s: diag_buffer(%p), "
"offset(%d), sz(%d)
", ioc->name, __func__,
diag_data, karg.starting_offset, karg.bytes_to_read));

+ /* Truncate data on requests that are too large */
+ if ((diag_data + karg.bytes_to_read < diag_data) ||
+ (diag_data + karg.bytes_to_read > request_data + request_size))
+ copy_size = request_size - karg.starting_offset;
+ else
+ copy_size = karg.bytes_to_read;
+
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)uarg->diagnostic_data,
- diag_data, karg.bytes_to_read)) {
+ diag_data, copy_size)) {
printk(MPT2SAS_ERR_FMT "%s: Unable to write "
"mpt_diag_read_buffer_t data @ %p
", ioc->name,
__func__, diag_data);
--
1.7.4.1


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