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-   -   next_pidmap: fix overflow condition, CVE-2011-1593 (http://www.linux-archive.org/ubuntu-kernel-team/528045-next_pidmap-fix-overflow-condition-cve-2011-1593-a.html)

Brad Figg 05-18-2011 10:12 PM

next_pidmap: fix overflow condition, CVE-2011-1593
 
On 05/18/2011 02:16 PM, Herton Ronaldo Krzesinski wrote:

From: Linus Torvalds<torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

CVE-2011-1593

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/784727

Released until now with stable versions 2.6.27.59, 2.6.32.39, 2.6.33.12,
2.6.35.13, 2.6.38.4

next_pidmap() just quietly accepted whatever 'last' pid that was passed
in, which is not all that safe when one of the users is /proc.

Admittedly the proc code should do some sanity checking on the range
(and that will be the next commit), but that doesn't mean that the
helper functions should just do that pidmap pointer arithmetic without
checking the range of its arguments.

So clamp 'last' to PID_MAX_LIMIT. The fact that we then do "last+1"
doesn't really matter, the for-loop does check against the end of the
pidmap array properly (it's only the actual pointer arithmetic overflow
case we need to worry about, and going one bit beyond isn't going to
overflow).

[ Use PID_MAX_LIMIT rather than pid_max as per Eric Biederman ]

Reported-by: Tavis Ormandy<taviso@cmpxchg8b.com>
Analyzed-by: Robert Święcki<robert@swiecki.net>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman<ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov<xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds<torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(backported from commit c78193e9c7bcbf25b8237ad0dec82f805c4ea69b upstream)
Signed-off-by: Herton Ronaldo Krzesinski<herton.krzesinski@canonical.com>
---
.../openvz/patchset/0001-2.6.24-ovz002.patch | 2 +-
kernel/pid.c | 5 ++++-
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/debian/binary-custom.d/openvz/patchset/0001-2.6.24-ovz002.patch b/debian/binary-custom.d/openvz/patchset/0001-2.6.24-ovz002.patch
index 729b278..6a8a613 100644
--- a/debian/binary-custom.d/openvz/patchset/0001-2.6.24-ovz002.patch
+++ b/debian/binary-custom.d/openvz/patchset/0001-2.6.24-ovz002.patch
@@ -62556,7 +62556,7 @@ Index: kernel/kernel/pid.c
+ return pid;
+}
+
- static int next_pidmap(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns, int last)
+ static int next_pidmap(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns, unsigned int last)
{
int offset;
@@ -198,6 +231,7 @@
diff --git a/kernel/pid.c b/kernel/pid.c
index f815455..29f0ac0 100644
--- a/kernel/pid.c
+++ b/kernel/pid.c
@@ -181,11 +181,14 @@ static int alloc_pidmap(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns)
return -1;
}

-static int next_pidmap(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns, int last)
+static int next_pidmap(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns, unsigned int last)
{
int offset;
struct pidmap *map, *end;

+ if (last>= PID_MAX_LIMIT)
+ return -1;
+
offset = (last + 1)& BITS_PER_PAGE_MASK;
map =&pid_ns->pidmap[(last + 1)/BITS_PER_PAGE];
end =&pid_ns->pidmap[PIDMAP_ENTRIES];


Acked-by: Brad Figg <brad.figg@canonical.com>

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John Johansen 05-19-2011 12:19 AM

next_pidmap: fix overflow condition, CVE-2011-1593
 
On 05/18/2011 02:16 PM, Herton Ronaldo Krzesinski wrote:
> From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
>
> CVE-2011-1593
>
> BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/784727
>
> Released until now with stable versions 2.6.27.59, 2.6.32.39, 2.6.33.12,
> 2.6.35.13, 2.6.38.4
>
> next_pidmap() just quietly accepted whatever 'last' pid that was passed
> in, which is not all that safe when one of the users is /proc.
>
> Admittedly the proc code should do some sanity checking on the range
> (and that will be the next commit), but that doesn't mean that the
> helper functions should just do that pidmap pointer arithmetic without
> checking the range of its arguments.
>
> So clamp 'last' to PID_MAX_LIMIT. The fact that we then do "last+1"
> doesn't really matter, the for-loop does check against the end of the
> pidmap array properly (it's only the actual pointer arithmetic overflow
> case we need to worry about, and going one bit beyond isn't going to
> overflow).
>
> [ Use PID_MAX_LIMIT rather than pid_max as per Eric Biederman ]
>
> Reported-by: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@cmpxchg8b.com>
> Analyzed-by: Robert Święcki <robert@swiecki.net>
> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
> (backported from commit c78193e9c7bcbf25b8237ad0dec82f805c4ea69b upstream)
> Signed-off-by: Herton Ronaldo Krzesinski <herton.krzesinski@canonical.com>

Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

> ---
> .../openvz/patchset/0001-2.6.24-ovz002.patch | 2 +-
> kernel/pid.c | 5 ++++-
> 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/debian/binary-custom.d/openvz/patchset/0001-2.6.24-ovz002.patch b/debian/binary-custom.d/openvz/patchset/0001-2.6.24-ovz002.patch
> index 729b278..6a8a613 100644
> --- a/debian/binary-custom.d/openvz/patchset/0001-2.6.24-ovz002.patch
> +++ b/debian/binary-custom.d/openvz/patchset/0001-2.6.24-ovz002.patch
> @@ -62556,7 +62556,7 @@ Index: kernel/kernel/pid.c
> + return pid;
> +}
> +
> - static int next_pidmap(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns, int last)
> + static int next_pidmap(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns, unsigned int last)
> {
> int offset;
> @@ -198,6 +231,7 @@
> diff --git a/kernel/pid.c b/kernel/pid.c
> index f815455..29f0ac0 100644
> --- a/kernel/pid.c
> +++ b/kernel/pid.c
> @@ -181,11 +181,14 @@ static int alloc_pidmap(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns)
> return -1;
> }
>
> -static int next_pidmap(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns, int last)
> +static int next_pidmap(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns, unsigned int last)
> {
> int offset;
> struct pidmap *map, *end;
>
> + if (last >= PID_MAX_LIMIT)
> + return -1;
> +
> offset = (last + 1) & BITS_PER_PAGE_MASK;
> map = &pid_ns->pidmap[(last + 1)/BITS_PER_PAGE];
> end = &pid_ns->pidmap[PIDMAP_ENTRIES];


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