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Old 03-17-2011, 08:58 PM
Leann Ogasawara
 
Default sound: Prevent buffer overflow in OSS load_mixer_volumes, CVE-2010-4527

The following changes since commit a03e8e64c82377c67d844a823e6a1ac673debc73:
Tavis Ormandy (1):
Revised [CVE-2010-4345 Karmic] install_special_mapping skips security_file_mmap check. CVE-2010-4346

are available in the git repository at:

git://kernel.ubuntu.com/ogasawara/ubuntu-karmic.git CVE-2010-4527

Dan Rosenberg (1):
sound: Prevent buffer overflow in OSS load_mixer_volumes, CVE-2010-4527

sound/oss/soundcard.c | 4 ++--
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 
Old 03-17-2011, 08:58 PM
Leann Ogasawara
 
Default sound: Prevent buffer overflow in OSS load_mixer_volumes, CVE-2010-4527

The following changes since commit 7fec2f29a52bd5c07921df6e0dc443de7ef5c9f4:
Brad Figg (1):
UBUNTU: Ubuntu-2.6.24-29.88

are available in the git repository at:

git://kernel.ubuntu.com/ogasawara/ubuntu-hardy.git CVE-2010-4527

Dan Rosenberg (1):
sound: Prevent buffer overflow in OSS load_mixer_volumes, CVE-2010-4527

sound/oss/soundcard.c | 4 ++--
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 
Old 03-17-2011, 08:59 PM
Leann Ogasawara
 
Default sound: Prevent buffer overflow in OSS load_mixer_volumes, CVE-2010-4527

The following changes since commit 2ce9a046a401ab70b7719085dd1b51e2f4a56a42:
Brad Figg (1):
UBUNTU: Ubuntu-2.6.15-57.95

are available in the git repository at:

git://kernel.ubuntu.com/ogasawara/ubuntu-dapper.git CVE-2010-4527

Dan Rosenberg (1):
sound: Prevent buffer overflow in OSS load_mixer_volumes, CVE-2010-4527

sound/oss/soundcard.c | 4 ++--
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 
Old 03-18-2011, 12:31 AM
Tim Gardner
 
Default sound: Prevent buffer overflow in OSS load_mixer_volumes, CVE-2010-4527

On 03/17/2011 03:59 PM, Leann Ogasawara wrote:

The following changes since commit 2ce9a046a401ab70b7719085dd1b51e2f4a56a42:
Brad Figg (1):
UBUNTU: Ubuntu-2.6.15-57.95

are available in the git repository at:

git://kernel.ubuntu.com/ogasawara/ubuntu-dapper.git CVE-2010-4527

Dan Rosenberg (1):
sound: Prevent buffer overflow in OSS load_mixer_volumes, CVE-2010-4527

sound/oss/soundcard.c | 4 ++--
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

From 9a0b6c4bd252c7888731071956e5ec904a6fa82c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dan Rosenberg<drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Date: Sat, 25 Dec 2010 16:23:40 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] sound: Prevent buffer overflow in OSS load_mixer_volumes, CVE-2010-4527

CVE-2010-4527

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/737073

The load_mixer_volumes() function, which can be triggered by
unprivileged users via the SOUND_MIXER_SETLEVELS ioctl, is vulnerable to
a buffer overflow. Because the provided "name" argument isn't
guaranteed to be NULL terminated at the expected 32 bytes, it's possible
to overflow past the end of the last element in the mixer_vols array.
Further exploitation can result in an arbitrary kernel write (via
subsequent calls to load_mixer_volumes()) leading to privilege
escalation, or arbitrary kernel reads via get_mixer_levels(). In
addition, the strcmp() may leak bytes beyond the mixer_vols array.

Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg<drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable<stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai<tiwai@suse.de>
(cherry picked from commit d81a12bc29ae4038770e05dce4ab7f26fd5880fb)

Signed-off-by: Leann Ogasawara<leann.ogasawara@canonical.com>
---
sound/oss/soundcard.c | 4 ++--
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/sound/oss/soundcard.c b/sound/oss/soundcard.c
index d33bb46..4f12363 100644
--- a/sound/oss/soundcard.c
+++ b/sound/oss/soundcard.c
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ int *load_mixer_volumes(char *name, int *levels, int present)
int i, n;

for (i = 0; i< num_mixer_volumes; i++) {
- if (strcmp(name, mixer_vols[i].name) == 0) {
+ if (strncmp(name, mixer_vols[i].name, 32) == 0) {
if (present)
mixer_vols[i].num = i;
return mixer_vols[i].levels;
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ int *load_mixer_volumes(char *name, int *levels, int present)
}
n = num_mixer_volumes++;

- strcpy(mixer_vols[n].name, name);
+ strncpy(mixer_vols[n].name, name, 32);

if (present)
mixer_vols[n].num = n;


Acked-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>

--
Tim Gardner tim.gardner@canonical.com

--
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https://lists.ubuntu.com/mailman/listinfo/kernel-team
 
Old 03-18-2011, 12:32 AM
Tim Gardner
 
Default sound: Prevent buffer overflow in OSS load_mixer_volumes, CVE-2010-4527

On 03/17/2011 03:58 PM, Leann Ogasawara wrote:

The following changes since commit a03e8e64c82377c67d844a823e6a1ac673debc73:
Tavis Ormandy (1):
Revised [CVE-2010-4345 Karmic] install_special_mapping skips security_file_mmap check. CVE-2010-4346

are available in the git repository at:

git://kernel.ubuntu.com/ogasawara/ubuntu-karmic.git CVE-2010-4527

Dan Rosenberg (1):
sound: Prevent buffer overflow in OSS load_mixer_volumes, CVE-2010-4527

sound/oss/soundcard.c | 4 ++--
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

From 20c0067ab984fe024e594a2aa8429fa9a23c1001 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dan Rosenberg<drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Date: Sat, 25 Dec 2010 16:23:40 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] sound: Prevent buffer overflow in OSS load_mixer_volumes, CVE-2010-4527

CVE-2010-4527

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/737073

The load_mixer_volumes() function, which can be triggered by
unprivileged users via the SOUND_MIXER_SETLEVELS ioctl, is vulnerable to
a buffer overflow. Because the provided "name" argument isn't
guaranteed to be NULL terminated at the expected 32 bytes, it's possible
to overflow past the end of the last element in the mixer_vols array.
Further exploitation can result in an arbitrary kernel write (via
subsequent calls to load_mixer_volumes()) leading to privilege
escalation, or arbitrary kernel reads via get_mixer_levels(). In
addition, the strcmp() may leak bytes beyond the mixer_vols array.

Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg<drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable<stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai<tiwai@suse.de>
(cherry picked from commit d81a12bc29ae4038770e05dce4ab7f26fd5880fb)

Signed-off-by: Leann Ogasawara<leann.ogasawara@canonical.com>
---
sound/oss/soundcard.c | 4 ++--
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/sound/oss/soundcard.c b/sound/oss/soundcard.c
index 61aaeda..31ee786 100644
--- a/sound/oss/soundcard.c
+++ b/sound/oss/soundcard.c
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ int *load_mixer_volumes(char *name, int *levels, int present)
int i, n;

for (i = 0; i< num_mixer_volumes; i++) {
- if (strcmp(name, mixer_vols[i].name) == 0) {
+ if (strncmp(name, mixer_vols[i].name, 32) == 0) {
if (present)
mixer_vols[i].num = i;
return mixer_vols[i].levels;
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ int *load_mixer_volumes(char *name, int *levels, int present)
}
n = num_mixer_volumes++;

- strcpy(mixer_vols[n].name, name);
+ strncpy(mixer_vols[n].name, name, 32);

if (present)
mixer_vols[n].num = n;


Acked-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>

--
Tim Gardner tim.gardner@canonical.com

--
kernel-team mailing list
kernel-team@lists.ubuntu.com
https://lists.ubuntu.com/mailman/listinfo/kernel-team
 
Old 03-21-2011, 08:36 AM
Stefan Bader
 
Default sound: Prevent buffer overflow in OSS load_mixer_volumes, CVE-2010-4527

On 03/17/2011 10:58 PM, Leann Ogasawara wrote:
> The following changes since commit a03e8e64c82377c67d844a823e6a1ac673debc73:
> Tavis Ormandy (1):
> Revised [CVE-2010-4345 Karmic] install_special_mapping skips security_file_mmap check. CVE-2010-4346
>
> are available in the git repository at:
>
> git://kernel.ubuntu.com/ogasawara/ubuntu-karmic.git CVE-2010-4527
>
> Dan Rosenberg (1):
> sound: Prevent buffer overflow in OSS load_mixer_volumes, CVE-2010-4527
>
> sound/oss/soundcard.c | 4 ++--
> 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> From 20c0067ab984fe024e594a2aa8429fa9a23c1001 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
> Date: Sat, 25 Dec 2010 16:23:40 -0500
> Subject: [PATCH] sound: Prevent buffer overflow in OSS load_mixer_volumes, CVE-2010-4527
>
> CVE-2010-4527
>
> BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/737073
>
> The load_mixer_volumes() function, which can be triggered by
> unprivileged users via the SOUND_MIXER_SETLEVELS ioctl, is vulnerable to
> a buffer overflow. Because the provided "name" argument isn't
> guaranteed to be NULL terminated at the expected 32 bytes, it's possible
> to overflow past the end of the last element in the mixer_vols array.
> Further exploitation can result in an arbitrary kernel write (via
> subsequent calls to load_mixer_volumes()) leading to privilege
> escalation, or arbitrary kernel reads via get_mixer_levels(). In
> addition, the strcmp() may leak bytes beyond the mixer_vols array.
>
> Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
> Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
> (cherry picked from commit d81a12bc29ae4038770e05dce4ab7f26fd5880fb)
>
> Signed-off-by: Leann Ogasawara <leann.ogasawara@canonical.com>
> ---
> sound/oss/soundcard.c | 4 ++--
> 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/sound/oss/soundcard.c b/sound/oss/soundcard.c
> index 61aaeda..31ee786 100644
> --- a/sound/oss/soundcard.c
> +++ b/sound/oss/soundcard.c
> @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ int *load_mixer_volumes(char *name, int *levels, int present)
> int i, n;
>
> for (i = 0; i < num_mixer_volumes; i++) {
> - if (strcmp(name, mixer_vols[i].name) == 0) {
> + if (strncmp(name, mixer_vols[i].name, 32) == 0) {
> if (present)
> mixer_vols[i].num = i;
> return mixer_vols[i].levels;
> @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ int *load_mixer_volumes(char *name, int *levels, int present)
> }
> n = num_mixer_volumes++;
>
> - strcpy(mixer_vols[n].name, name);
> + strncpy(mixer_vols[n].name, name, 32);
>
> if (present)
> mixer_vols[n].num = n;

Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>

Note, I won't apply this as the Karmic repos currently look like in the process
of doing a release/upload.

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Old 03-21-2011, 11:42 AM
Tim Gardner
 
Default sound: Prevent buffer overflow in OSS load_mixer_volumes, CVE-2010-4527

applied

--
Tim Gardner tim.gardner@canonical.com

--
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https://lists.ubuntu.com/mailman/listinfo/kernel-team
 
Old 04-25-2011, 04:24 PM
Brad Figg
 
Default sound: Prevent buffer overflow in OSS load_mixer_volumes, CVE-2010-4527

On 03/17/2011 02:59 PM, Leann Ogasawara wrote:

The following changes since commit 2ce9a046a401ab70b7719085dd1b51e2f4a56a42:
Brad Figg (1):
UBUNTU: Ubuntu-2.6.15-57.95

are available in the git repository at:

git://kernel.ubuntu.com/ogasawara/ubuntu-dapper.git CVE-2010-4527

Dan Rosenberg (1):
sound: Prevent buffer overflow in OSS load_mixer_volumes, CVE-2010-4527

sound/oss/soundcard.c | 4 ++--
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

From 9a0b6c4bd252c7888731071956e5ec904a6fa82c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dan Rosenberg<drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Date: Sat, 25 Dec 2010 16:23:40 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] sound: Prevent buffer overflow in OSS load_mixer_volumes, CVE-2010-4527

CVE-2010-4527

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/737073

The load_mixer_volumes() function, which can be triggered by
unprivileged users via the SOUND_MIXER_SETLEVELS ioctl, is vulnerable to
a buffer overflow. Because the provided "name" argument isn't
guaranteed to be NULL terminated at the expected 32 bytes, it's possible
to overflow past the end of the last element in the mixer_vols array.
Further exploitation can result in an arbitrary kernel write (via
subsequent calls to load_mixer_volumes()) leading to privilege
escalation, or arbitrary kernel reads via get_mixer_levels(). In
addition, the strcmp() may leak bytes beyond the mixer_vols array.

Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg<drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable<stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai<tiwai@suse.de>
(cherry picked from commit d81a12bc29ae4038770e05dce4ab7f26fd5880fb)

Signed-off-by: Leann Ogasawara<leann.ogasawara@canonical.com>
---
sound/oss/soundcard.c | 4 ++--
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/sound/oss/soundcard.c b/sound/oss/soundcard.c
index d33bb46..4f12363 100644
--- a/sound/oss/soundcard.c
+++ b/sound/oss/soundcard.c
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ int *load_mixer_volumes(char *name, int *levels, int present)
int i, n;

for (i = 0; i< num_mixer_volumes; i++) {
- if (strcmp(name, mixer_vols[i].name) == 0) {
+ if (strncmp(name, mixer_vols[i].name, 32) == 0) {
if (present)
mixer_vols[i].num = i;
return mixer_vols[i].levels;
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ int *load_mixer_volumes(char *name, int *levels, int present)
}
n = num_mixer_volumes++;

- strcpy(mixer_vols[n].name, name);
+ strncpy(mixer_vols[n].name, name, 32);

if (present)
mixer_vols[n].num = n;


Acked-by: Brad Figg <brad.figg@canonical.com>

--
Brad Figg brad.figg@canonical.com http://www.canonical.com

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