Fwd: talking to mcstrans in MLS enforcing on rhel6 beta
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Xavier Toth <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Date: Wed, May 12, 2010 at 10:38 AM
Subject: Re: talking to mcstrans in MLS enforcing on rhel6 beta
To: Stephen Smalley <email@example.com>
On Tue, May 11, 2010 at 4:13 PM, Stephen Smalley <firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote:
> On Tue, 2010-05-11 at 11:10 -0500, Xavier Toth wrote:
>> I'm a bit confused about something. mcstransd creates a socket and
>> through a transition rule it get labeled setrans_var_run_t (this is
>> also the type used with mls_trusted_object in the setrans policy)
>> however when other apps try and connect to it the target context type
>> is setrans_t which of course isn't trusted so no one can connect. As
>> an experiment I added setrans_t as a mls trusted object and then other
>> apps could connect. Not sure where the target context comes from on
>> connectto because the socket file is label setrans_var_run_t on the
>> disk. Something needs fixing just not sure what. Doesn't seem right to
>> add 'mls_trusted_object(setrans_t)'.
> When you create and bind a Unix domain socket in the file system
> namespace (as opposed to the abstract namespace), there are two objects:
> the socket itself (created upon the socket call, labeled with the label
> of the creating process), and the file (created upon the bind call,
> labeled in accordance with the usual file labeling behavior).
> Connecting to such a socket requires both write access to the file and
> connectto permission to the socket. *So connectto is a socket-to-socket
> (which looks like process-to-process since sockets are labeled based on
> creating process and act as proxies/queues between processes) check.
> Stephen Smalley
> National Security Agency
So mls_trusted_object(setrans_t) needs to be added.
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