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Harald Beugler-Bell wrote:
> I got a similar problem when trying to run cron as root. It looks like selinux is unable to get the correct user context of the crond process
> crond: (*system*) NULL security context for user ()
> crond: CRON (root) ERROR: failed to change SELinux context
> crond: CRON (root) ERROR: cannot set security context
> The file context of the cron file is set according to default context:
> $ ls -lZ /etc/cron.d/testing-cron
> -rw-r--r-- root root system_u
> $ ps -efZ | grep crond
> staff_u:system_r:crond_t:s0 root 14922 1 0 00:19 ? 00:00:00 /usr/sbin/crond start
> $ /usr/sbin/semanage login -l | egrep "root|system"
> root root s0-s0:c0.c1023
> system_u system_u s0-s0:c0.c1023
> bash-3.1# cat /etc/redhat-release
> Red Hat Enterprise Linux Server release 5 (Tikanga)
> any help is welcome.
> ----- Ursprüngliche Mail ----
> Von: Aleksander Adamowski <email@example.com>
> An: firstname.lastname@example.org
> Gesendet: Mittwoch, den 28. November 2007, 16:10:58 Uhr
> Betreff: Re: RHEL5 + strict policy: Unprivileged user cron - "Unauthorized SELinux context"
> Stephen Smalley pisze:
>> On Wed, 2007-11-28 at 21:16 +0100, Aleksander Adamowski wrote:
>>> crond: (apache) Unauthorized SELinux context, but SELinux in
>>> permissive mode, continuing (cron/apache)
>>> crond: (apache) NULL security context for user, but SELinux
>>> permissive mode, continuing ()
>> Sounds like it just stayed in crond's context since it failed the
>> and the system was permissive. Naturally, in enforcing mode, it
>> have not executed the job at all.
>> crond computes a context for the user's cron job in the usual manner,
>> then applies a entrypoint permission check between that context and
>> file context on the crontab file (which gets picked up from a
>> combination of its creator and the parent directory). If that check
>> fails, then crond refuses to execute the crontab commands in that
>> process context. The check is intended to prevent injection of
>> from one context into another via crontab, unless authorized by
>> of course.
> That's reasonable.
>> I'd have expected it to try to run the cron job in user_u:user_r:
>> user_crond_t:s0 since apache wouldn't have a specific entry in
>> So it would have wanted the crontab file to have user_cron_spool_t on
>> it, which would have happened if a user_t process created it. If
>> instead an admin created it and it got sysadm_cron_spool_t or
>> staff_cron_spool_t, that might explain it. So you could relabel it
>> allow that permission. First though check the current label on the
>> crontab file.
> Yes, you're right. That was precisely the cause.
> I've used "crontab -e -u apache" as root.
> The files in /var/spool/cron got sysadm_cron_spool_t type (the full
> context was root
> After running "fixfiles relabel /var/spool/cron/", the apache crontab
> got system_u
> Now cron runs fine and doesn't log anything suspicious.
> IMHO crontab should be modified to relabel crontab files that are
> using the "-u" option, but this is a question to Dan - should I file a
> new bug to bugzilla.redhat.com on this?
Please update to the U1 policy.
I think you should be able to get this from RHN or you can grab it off of
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